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Australian Workers and Unions 
Should Support Basic Income. 
John Tomlinson, Simon Schooneveldt and Penny 
Harrington 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
The journey to a full universal Basic Income is essentially the search for the answer to just one 
question: “How do we best meet the income support needs of all who find they are without 
the capacity to provide for themselves?” This paper will try to answer that question. 
 
Introduction  
Australia has a federal system where the Commonwealth Government has responsibility for 
social security. Nationally social security started with age and disability pension legislation in 
1908. Since then, with the exception of blind pensions and child endowment, social security 
payments have been means – or asset – (sometimes both) tested. Thus the system is 
categorical and selective rather than universal. The categories reflect the positive light in which 
the needs of chosen beneficiaries are held by the powerful. For example, widows with children 
have been paid since the mid-1940s but most unwed mothers were not paid social security 
until 1973. Since 1977 the Government has assisted all lone parents who meet the specified 
requirements. 
Australians have been subject to increasing inequalities in income and wealth distribution 
during the last two decades due in large part to a general acceptance of economic 
fundamentalist ideas and government enthusiasm for deregulation and globalism. Michael 
Costello1, former Secretary of the Department of Industrial Relations, succinctly summed up 
the changes occurring in Australia when he wrote: “If you were hard up, you used to get a 
hand-up from government. Now you get the back of its hand.”  
Under the previous Labor Government, low paid workers were compensated for declining real 
income from employment by increases in the social wage. The current conservative Howard 
Liberal Coalition Government recently elected for a fourth term and now with ‘control’ of both 
houses of the parliament has assaulted the social wage. The universality of Medicare (health 
insurance) has been weakened, the dental service for low-income earners abolished, and the 
social security safety-net has been undermined. The 2005/6 Budget outlined the Government’s 
determination to get single parents back into the workforce once their youngest child is at 
school. Likewise, it has reinvigorated attempts to move people off disability pensions onto 
unemployment benefits with onerous ‘mutual obligation’ activity requirements.2 Since coming 
to office in 1996, this Government has undermined the dignity and rights of Indigenous 
Australians and asylum seekers. 
Job insecurity has increased; the Government is determined to weaken the fair dismissal 
legislation. The officially recognised unemployment level has dropped below 6% but if people 
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who are underemployed, discouraged unemployed and disguised unemployed are taken into 
account the real level of unemployment is in the order of 12 to 18% of people of working age. 
Unemployment and the weakening of the social security safety net are real issues for low-
income wage earners because people in the bottom 30% of income distribution are the ones 
most likely to experience periodic unemployment interspersed with short stints in casualised, 
part-time and precarious employment. 
Captains of industry are gaining disproportionate rewards – the ratio between Chief Executive 
Officers’ salaries and those of workers has risen from 3 times workers’ salaries in the 1970s to 
74 times workers’ salaries.3 Increasingly arduous work ‘flexibility’ arrangements are being 
imposed. The industrial arbitration commission and the union movement are constantly 
challenged by Government attempts to impose a draconian industrial relations regime. 
Australia over the last two decades has been converted from a reasonably caring, mixed 
economy with a frugal but comprehensive social security safety net into a country where 
private provision, “individualisation of risk”4 and a “do it yourself welfare state”5 is the order of 
the day. The Government has intensified the rhetoric about the evils of “welfare dependency” 
as a way to decrease the legitimacy of claims for government assistance. In doing so it has 
foisted the obligation to support those in financial need back onto families. 
This portrait of Australia may make it appear unlikely that a Basic Income paid to each 
permanent resident, as an individual, irrespective of their personal or social circumstances will 
be introduced in the near future: yet as will be seen there are grounds for optimism. A Basic 
Income system would be more just than the existing Australian system of income support. Low 
income-earners would be net beneficiaries of a Basic Income whereas rich Australians would 
not be economically advantaged by it because they would pay more in tax than they gain in 
benefits. 
 
Income Support Schemes 
Before we can examine Basic Income further, it is useful to outline other existing and proposed 
systems of income support. 
 
Private superannuation and other privatised solutions 
In Australia, private superannuation is the only form of superannuation available to non-
government workers. The amount paid is proportional to contributions from workers’ salaries 
(paid by workers and by their employers) or private investments made during the workers’ 
employment. The inequalities experienced during working lives are extended into the post-
working phase of people’s lives. All private superannuation funds are at some degree of risk. 
The Australian Government Superannuation watchdog recently warned that at least 10% of 
funds are insecure.6 Some workers, particularly those who in recent years have been forced by 
their ‘employer’ to become contractors, have private unemployment, sickness and accident 
insurance. It is not an affordable option for the majority of workers.  
 
The Job Guarantee 
A job guarantee can only exist when a government is prepared to commit itself to becoming an 
employer of last resort. In the last thirty years there have been two forms of limited job 
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guarantee provided by Australian governments. The first in the 1970s, under the Whitlam 
Labor Government, was the Regional Employment Development Scheme, and the second was 
the job offer, after 18 months unemployment, under the Keating Labor’s Working Nation 
package in the mid 1990s. The Centre for Full Employment and Equity at the University of 
Newcastle is promoting the most detailed current Australian proposal for a job guarantee. 
Under a job guarantee, those who are available and capable of doing the work on offer will be 
assisted. But those who cannot find suitable child care, or have a disability will be unable to 
take up a job under the job guarantee unless child care is provided and the obstacles to 
obtaining and keeping employment are overcome for people with a disability. 
 
Social Security 
The greater the universality in any system of social security the nearer it comes to being an 
income guarantee. For instance, in Australia, all long-term residents who exceed specified age 
limits are entitled to apply for the age pension. The age limit for women is gradually being 
phased in to equal that of men. If their income and assets are below a specified amount they 
will receive payment. This is a Guaranteed Minimum Income for older Australian residents. 
Current age limits are 65 years for men and 62.5 years for women. Yet it needs to be 
remembered that the average age of death for Indigenous Australians is 56 years for men and 
62 years for women. This compares with rates in the non-Indigenous population of 76 years 
men and 83 years for women. In Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory three-quarters of Indigenous male deaths and two-thirds of Indigenous 
female deaths occurred before the age of 65 years compared with one-quarter of male and 
one-sixth of female total deaths in Australia.7 
Social security benefits are targeted to those whom the government has decided should be 
paid. Complexity, stigma, system failure and recipients’ lack of sophisticated knowledge about 
bureaucracies results in many eligible people not receiving their proper entitlements. The 
Brotherhood of St Laurence and St Vincent de Paul 2003 report entitled “Much Obliged” 
asserts that people who become long term unemployed have so much of their time taken up 
just meeting the obligations imposed on them by the Government that they don’t have time to 
find work: the report concludes the mutual obligation regime “is failing the most 
disadvantaged job seekers. Overall the system operates (…) not as ‘welfare to work’ but 
‘welfare as work’”.8 
 
Guaranteed Minimum Income, Negative Income Tax and Tax Credits 
The first fully elaborated book length Basic Income proposal, in the English language, was 
written by Dennis Milner in 1920. A Guaranteed Minimum Income, if it is available to all 
permanent residents, is very much like a Basic Income except for the requirement to establish 
that an individual’s income and or assets are below the amount that is allowed. In 1943, Lady 
Juliet Rhys-Williams was the first English writer to provide a book length outline of the idea of 
a guaranteed minimum income. The purpose of such an income guarantee was in Rhys-
Williams’ words “to provide a ‘floor’ below which he (or she) cannot fall, but ought not to have 
a ceiling beyond which he (or she) can rise”.9 In 1970, Ian Braybrook wrote the first academic 
paper on negative income tax in Australia. The earliest Australian proposal to introduce a 
negative income tax was that of the Priorities Review Staff of the year 1975.  
A Tax Credit is a form of negative income tax paid through the tax system. The aim of a 
guaranteed minimum income, negative income tax and tax credits is essentially to provide a 
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minimum income guarantee to those whose incomes fall below a specified amount. All these 
generalised forms of income support differ, in theory, from categorical payments in at least 
one important regard. They make no presumption about social eligibility. Yet when income 
guarantee policies are formulated residues from categorical social security policies are 
frequently present. When Professor Ronald Henderson, Head of the Poverty Inquiry, proposed 
his guaranteed minimum income10 he wanted a two-tiered structure, using the family as the 
unit of income, which distinguished between those in receipt of benefits or pensions and those 
who did not then qualify. Other Australian guaranteed minimum income proposals have used 
the household as the unit for payment.11 Such proposals ignored the inequities present in 
intra-family and intra-household transfers. 
 
Participation Income 
Participation Income ideas are widespread in the present Australian system of income support. 
Participation income is a euphemism for the chance to impose an obligation on people who 
receive government or government-subsidised payments coupled with the paternalistic belief 
that this will assist the recipient to improve their life. Many researchers have described the 
philosophical underpinnings of Participation Income as unethical12 because the only choice 
offered to welfare recipients is comply or starve. The practical outcomes for those who are 
breached are socially disastrous.13 Evidence is emerging from the United States which suggests 
that a reduction in or removal of social security payments leads to increased health difficulties 
for children. 
There is little recognition that workfare jobs entrench low paid employment by displacing full-
time, above poverty-line jobs.14 “Work for the dole” and Community Development 
Employment Program (CDEP) jobs in Australia have a similar effect of entrenching poverty.15 
The CDEP is a “work for the dole” program operating in Indigenous communities since 1977. 
The bulk of Indigenous “jobs” on Indigenous communities are CDEP “jobs” – paid at about the 
rate of unemployment benefits and only the most misguided would claim that such “jobs” 
have abolished poverty in Indigenous Australia. 
Advocates of participation income seem oblivious to the life experiences of low paid workers’ 
revealed in 2003 in the Australian Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union’s 
(LHMU) submission to the Senate Inquiry into Poverty. There is very little recognition of the 
demoralisation that follows in the wake of working full-time yet still being in poverty, or only 
being able to gain casualised, poorly renumerated, precarious employment. 
The impact of enforcing obligations upon unemployed people, insufficiently employed people, 
lone parents and people with disabilities is the same whether it is expressed in the considered 
tones of Patrick McClure’s Report of 2000, or, one year before this, Minister Abbott’s 
suggestion that unemployed people are “job snobs”. The hysterical denunciation of “welfare 
dependency” and particularly intergenerational “welfare dependency” is based on a myth. 
There have been no intergenerational panel studies of long-term social security recipients in 
Australia. Recent overseas long-term panel studies refute such assertions.16 Cook, Dodd and 
Mitchell17 report that since 1975 in Australia there have been around eleven job seekers for 
each job vacancy. 
Some researchers18 have argued that if a Basic Income was put in place that workers would 
stay away from work in droves; whereas other researchers have argued the exact opposite.19 
The only study conducted in Australia into the impact on work willingness (where low-income 
families were provided with a guaranteed minimum income), showed these families 
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experienced no decline in work willingness.20 Van Parijs21 claims that because a Basic Income is 
paid, irrespective of all other sources of income, it can be used by those who desire work as a 
wage subsidy; yet, because it provides sufficient income on which to live, it does not compel 
any potential worker to work under conditions which that worker finds unacceptable.  
 
Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
The rate of tax people pay is very confusing because of the progressive tax rates in the 
Australian income tax system, the presence of family allowances paid through the tax system 
and because the social security system and the tax systems intersect; as a result many families 
do not get much benefit from extra income they obtain by working. Many low-income earners 
pay a greater proportion of their income in direct and indirect tax than do more affluent 
citizens. It is a long-acknowledged problem which governments over the years have failed to 
address adequately. The Government took a small step to reduce withdrawal rates from 70% 
to 60% in its 2005/6 Budget. 
 
Tax 
Australian taxpayers are, for most taxation purposes, assessed as individuals. But eligibility for 
most social security benefits is calculated in terms of total family income. A person applying for 
social security benefit can be refused payment if they have a partner who is earning more than 
a specified income. If an employed person is supporting a partner who is without income, that 
person cannot lower their tax by counting the income as spread between two people. A 
government, interested in assisting families to stay together, would not persevere with the 
existing social security arrangements which discriminate against people pooling their 
resources. With a Basic Income, unlike all the other forms of public assistance discussed, 
neither the employment income nor the amount of Basic Income is directly affected by the 
other source of income. The withdrawal rate is the income tax rate on earned income. 
Importantly this removes poverty traps and work disincentives simultaneously. 
In the current climate of individual work contracts and increasingly precarious employment, 
rather than relying upon individual employers to pay a wage sufficient to lift workers out of 
poverty, organised labour needs to consider whether there is not considerable merit in the 
collective provision of a Basic Income. 
 
Why Australia needs a Universal Basic Income. 
The income support issues with which Australia is grappling at the start of the 21st century are 
remarkably similar to those which many other countries are confronting. Anyone who reads 
the papers in the Basic Income Earth Network’s 2002 and 2004 Conference Proceedings, which 
detail the work of researchers from every continent, could not fail to be struck by the 
similarities in the debates. It needs to be remembered that in the decade prior to the 1980s 
there were many social welfare improvements and a great hope for even more. The 
Henderson Poverty Inquiry’s First Main Report of 1975 endorsed the idea of introducing a 
guaranteed minimum income and the Whitlam Labor Government seemed accepting of the 
idea.  
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Social protection 
The prime reason for supporting a universal Basic Income is that it is the most socially just way 
of ensuring social protection.22 In an ideal world everyone would have their needs fully met 
and all would contribute their utmost to ensure that everyone’s needs were met. This was 
essentially what the welfare state was meant to do in the post-Second World War period. The 
current Australian social welfare system, due largely to under-funding resulting from economic 
fundamentalists’ constant attacks, is less capable of ensuring social protection for the most 
vulnerable than the Australian welfare state of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Many of the 
family support structures which were the first port of call for help in earlier times have been 
eroded; full-time work above the poverty-line is harder to find.  
 
Intergenerational distribution young / old  
Whereas social insurance payments are largely paid for by the contributions of workers, social 
security in Australia is paid from general taxation. In the 1960s and early 1970s age pensioners 
were often confined to poverty level incomes. The Henderson Poverty Inquiry of 1975 exposed 
this sorry state of affairs and now the Australian social security system treats age pensioners 
far more generously than unemployed people and younger unemployed people in particular. 
In Europe similar age-delineated inequities have led to intergenerational envy. Older 
Australians need to realise that their taxes went to pay the pensions of their parents’ 
generation. There is nothing left to pay theirs and if they don’t treat younger people better the 
young might refuse to contribute to older people’s support. A Basic Income, because it is paid 
equally to all, abolishes such intergenerational envy. 
 
Affordability 
In any social policy process the first and last question asked is “Is it affordable?” No space has 
been devoted to this question so far and it must be addressed. The Henderson Poverty Inquiry 
of 1975 showed that its guaranteed minimum income scheme was affordable. Keith Rankin has 
written extensively on the economic affordability of Basic Income in New Zealand. George has 
specifically addressed this question in relation to the United States. The Irish Government has 
declared it is affordable there.23 
In Australia, Saunders24 worried that a full universal Basic Income might require a 50% income 
tax rate which he considered politically unpalatable. This calculation was made prior to the 
GST which, now implemented, would lower the tax rate required to something more in line 
with what the Irish Government has recently declared would be necessary (that is 43 percent) 
to pay for an above-poverty-line Basic Income. This would mean that the required tax rate to 
pay for a Basic Income would be at or slightly above the current tax rate imposed on incomes 
exceeding $63,000 (probably in the order of 45 percent). 
Perhaps the last word on affordability should be left to José Iglesias Fernández25 who proposed 
a full universal Basic Income scheme for Catalonia paid at 50% of the average European Union 
wage. Considering whether his proposal was affordable, Iglesias Fernández wrote that since 
the Basic Income was only half of the per capita income that therefore the money needed to 
pay for it already existed and that it was simply a matter of redistribution. 
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Efficiency 
While Australia has 12 to 18 % of its working age labour force unemployed, underemployed, 
disguised unemployed or discouraged unemployed, it is clearly not making an efficient use of 
available labour in this country. The Commonwealth Government’s Committee on Employ-
ment Opportunities commented: “The loss of production through unemployment is the single 
greatest source of inefficiency in our economy. Unemployment is also the most important 
cause of inequality and alienation for individuals, families and communities”.26 
Governments in Australia are certainly capable of determining the cost of delivering specific 
categorical benefits to those who are paid. They can and do calculate how much they ‘save’ by 
cutting people off income support when they do not meet the eligibility requirements for any 
specific benefit. This is accounting or target efficiency. Governments seem uninterested in 
what social costs are incurred in the wake of decisions to remove income support from such 
citizens. Target efficiency processes give no measure of how efficient the system of social 
security is as a whole.  
Some of the system-wide questions, which would need to be answered if the efficiency of the 
system as a whole was being calculated, would be: 
 
- Are any of the people excluded from the social security system poor? 
- How many people who have an entitlement miss out? 
- How satisfied are the people who are confined to low levels of income support? 
- Does the social security system advance social justice for all permanent residents? 
- Are the human rights of all residents protected (or even enhanced)? 
- Does the system remove all obstacles to inclusion of people with a disability?  
- Are all genders, ages and ethnic groups treated equally or equitably?  
- Is there equitable treatment provided to people from the city and the country,  
- and does the system of income support provide sufficient security to recipients so as to 
 allow them to contribute to society in ways with which they are comfortable? 
 
Attempting to ascertain the degree of impairment experienced by an individual applicant and 
then paying those applicants who can establish they have met some predetermined ‘level of 
incapacity to work’ is costly and an extraordinarily inefficient way of providing income support 
to those with a disability. People with equivalent levels of impairment often have widely 
different employment histories. It would be more efficient to provide a universal income 
guarantee if the desire is to encourage productivity/contribution/inclusion by those who have 
a disability. Australian governments have recognised this in relation to Blind Pensioners27 but 
continue to subject others who have severe disabilities to stigmatised, selective, targeted, 
categorical payments. 
There are broader aspects of efficiency that can and should be mounted in support of an 
unconditional Basic Income: 
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- A Basic Income requires the least interference in the lives of citizens. 
- It supplies all permanent residents with equal assistance. 
- It is the most inclusive form of income support payment and the most secure, thus 
 enhancing citizenship.  
- It provides sufficient income to allow people to explore their creative capacity.  
- It removes many of the obstacles to a reinvigoration of industrial, technical and computing 
 infrastructure.  
- It allows the State a fuller understanding of the impact of its other social wage policies.  
 
Conclusion 
A universal Basic Income is not a utopian idea. It is an efficient affordable way to ensure no 
Australian permanent resident remains in poverty. However, a Basic Income is just that – an 
unconditional universal income guarantee. It delivers an income floor without impeding 
productivity. It is a vast improvement on categorical selective social services. It is an advance 
on all social insurance and private provision schemes which invariably result in the 
“individualisation of risk” and as a result create a “do it yourself welfare state”.  
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